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Purpose - To provide empirical evidence on the level of savings that can be attained by joint route 
planning and how these savings depend on specific market characteristics. 
Design/methodology/approach - Joint route planning is a measure that companies can take to decrease 
the costs of their distribution activities. Essentially, this can either be achieved through horizontal 
cooperation or through outsourcing distribution to a Logistics Service Provider. The synergy value is 
defined as the difference between distribution costs in the original situation where all entities perform their 
orders individually, and the costs of a system where all orders are collected and route schemes are set up 
simultaneously to exploit economies of scale. This paper provides estimates of synergy values, both in a 
constructed benchmark case and in a number of real-world cases. 
Findings - It turns out that synergy values of 30% are achievable. Furthermore, intuition is developed on 
how the synergy values depend on characteristics of the distribution problem under consideration. 
Practical implications – The developed intuition on the nature of synergy values can help practitioners to 
find suitable combinations of distribution systems, since synergy values can quickly be assessed based on 
the characteristics of the distribution problem, without solving large and difficult Vehicle Routing 
Problems. 
Originality/value – this paper addresses a major impediment to horizontal cooperation: estimating 
operational savings upfront. 
Keywords - Horizontal cooperation, Distribution, Retail, Outsourcing, Vehicle Routing with Time 
Windows 
Paper type - Research paper 
 
 




Fierce competition in global markets, the shortening of product life cycles, and the heightened 
expectations of customers are examples of trends that cause profit margins to shrink. As a result, 
companies show a strong tendency to decrease the costs of non-value adding activities, such as basic 
distribution. Moreover, the increasing number of mergers and acquisitions provide the required 
momentum for companies to rethink and rebuild their logistics processes (Eye for Transport, 2003). 
Consequently, the European logistics market is currently going through a structural reorganization. 
Nowadays however, the potential of internal reorganization of these processes has been almost completely 
exploited, and attention has shifted from optimizing internal logistics processes to better managing 
external relations in the supply chain (Skjoett-Larsen, 2000). As a result, one of the most fundamental 
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choices that companies face in redesigning their logistics processes is whether they i) keep the execution 
in-house, ii) outsource the logistics activities, or iii) seek partnerships with sister companies to exploit 
synergies (Groothedde, 2005). Combinations of these three possibilities may also prove a valid option. 




Razzaque and Sheng (1998) define outsourcing (or: third party logistics) as the provision of single or 
multiple logistics services by a vendor on a contractual basis. It has been estimated that about 40 percent 
of global logistics is outsourced (Wong et al., 2000), and increasingly many shippers consider it an 
attractive alternative to the traditional logistics service mode (Hong et al., 2004). Razzaque and Sheng 
(1998) and Wilding and Juriado (2004) provide literature reviews on outsourcing, investigating which 
activities are typically outsourced and the main reasons for doing this. The top five reasons found for 
outsourcing relate to 1) costs or revenue, 2) service, 3) operational flexibility, 4) business focus, 5) asset 
utilization or efficiency. Service Providers are able to achieve economies of scale by providing logistics 
services to a number of customers, making cost or revenue related reasons as the most important for 
shippers wishing to outsource logistics processes. The most commonly outsourced processes are 
Transportation and Shipment, Warehousing and Inventory, Information Systems and Value Added 
Services. 
 
1.2 Horizontal cooperation 
Horizontal cooperation is defined by the European Union (2001) as “concerted practices between 
companies operating at the same level(s) in the market”. Whereas this horizontal cooperation is common 
and well documented for the maritime shipping and aviation industry, the literature on horizontal 
cooperation in logistics and transport on the landside is fairly limited. 
 
In maritime shipping, conferences are a common concept. A conference is an alliance of multiple shipping 
companies that offer their services on a specific transport line against collective tariffs and identical 
service levels (van Eekhout, 2001). The advantages of these conferences are economies of scale as a result 
of larger volumes shipped and improved customer service (Shepperd and Seidman, 2001). Moreover, 
conferences prevent price wars by offering rate stability. Generally, shippers oppose conferences because 
they feel that the ability of carriers to effectively compete is greatly reduced by membership of a 
conference (Clarke, 1997). The frequent investigations into this claim have for example resulted in a series 
of US government acts ranging from as early as 1916 to 1998 (cf. Lewis and Vellenga, 2000). 
 
Alliances also play an increasingly dominant role in aviation. Some examples of major alliances are: 
Skyteam (9 airlines), Star Alliance (16 airlines), Qualifier (11 airlines), and OneWorld (8 airlines). 
Economically, there are of course strong incentives for airlines to operate dense international networks. 
Growth through mergers and acquisitions may provide a strong expansion of a network. However, the 
granting of international traffic rights is largely confined to specific carriers substantially owned by 
individual countries. This has left alliances of independent carriers as an effective compromise to 
international carriers to increase their joint market power (Fan, 2001). In addition to the quality customer 
service that is offered, aviation alliances enable higher load factors for aircrafts and more efficient back 
office organization. For further information on airline alliances, see e.g. Park (1997) and Oum et al. 
(2000). 
 
This paper focuses on horizontal cooperation initiatives with a long-term horizon involving a certain level 
of operational integration, i.e. type II and type III partnerships in the categorization of Lambert et al. 
(1996). The objective of horizontal cooperation in logistics is to improve service, efficiencies, and costs 
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associated with the transport and delivery process (Esper and Williams, 2003) thus rendering it an 
example of Collaborative Transportation Management (CTM). Horizontal cooperation in logistics is 
mainly gaining momentum in Western Europe. In Belgium and the Netherlands, the European logistics 
center of gravity, the authors are aware of over 50 (in)formal horizontal logistics partnerships. 
 
Through close cooperation, the partnering companies aim at increasing the competitiveness of their 
logistics networks. Some examples of specific goals are: reducing purchasing costs (e.g. onboard 
computers, storage systems, fuel, etc.), saving on storage costs by using joint facilities, and saving on non-
core activities (e.g. safety trainings, joint fuel facilities, etc.). All these cost savings can be estimated quite 
accurately by means of basic cost calculations. This is however not the case for savings on distribution 
costs that result from so-called joint route planning, i.e. horizontal cooperation that merges the distribution 
processes of the partnering companies to obtain scale economies. 
 
With joint route planning, the synergy value is defined as the (percent) difference between distribution 
costs in the original situation where all entities perform their orders individually, and the costs of a system 
where all orders are collected and route schemes are set up simultaneously. The bottom line is that both 
outsourcing and horizontal cooperation aim at increasing scale economies to ensure a more efficient 
execution of logistics processes. 
 
Empirical research (Cruijssen et al., forthcoming) has indicated that problems in quantifying the 
operational savings upfront constitute a major obstacle to horizontal cooperation. Therefore, the aim of 
this paper is to calculate the synergy value that cooperating companies may expect through joint route 
planning. 
 
1.3 Gain sharing 
The focus of the paper will be on determining the total savings that partners can attain by means of joint 
route planning. The question remains however as to the allocation of these savings. An appropriate 
approach would be to employ solution procedures from cooperative game theory for this task. Cooperative 
game theory models the negotiation process within a group of cooperating agents and allocates the 
generated savings. Game theoretical methods are able to objectively take into account each player’s 
impact within the group as a whole and produce allocations that distribute the synergy value based on 
clear-cut fairness properties. In general, this level of fairness cannot be attained by more simple 
proportional rules (e.g. proportional to the number of orders, to the total load shipped, or to the turnover of 
participants), as suggested by Altwegg (1995). A detailed discussion of gain sharing rules lies beyond the 
scope of this paper. This can be found in Cruijssen et al. (2005). 
 
This remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section the research framework and the 
routing model employed are explained. Furthermore, results are given on the synergy value in a 
benchmark case. In Section 3, the results are put into perspective by comparing them to the synergy values 
attained in a practical case concerning the distribution of frozen goods in the Dutch catering sector. 
Section 4 then describes a sensitivity analysis that is performed on six market characteristics of the 




2. Joint route planning 
 
Consider a system with multiple companies, each having a separate set of distribution orders. These 
distribution orders are requests for the delivery of goods from a single distribution centre to specified 
drop-off locations at customers’ sites. Such a situation both fits the case of outsourcing of warehousing 
and distribution processes to an LSP, and the case of horizontal cooperation between shippers or LSPs 
through a joint distribution centre. It also offers a good approximation for the more general situation in 
which joint route planning is done by a group of companies whose vehicle depots are located ‘sufficiently 
close’ to each other. In this setting whether these companies are shippers, logistics service providers, or 
even receivers of goods is of little importance: it is enough that the players have direct control over the 
flows of goods. Who executes the orders is irrelevant from the point of view of synergy. Therefore, in the 
remainder of this paper the companies will be referred to as flow controlling entities (FCE). 
 
2.1 Research framework 
This section presents a framework for comparing the sum of the distribution costs of individual FCEs with 
the distribution costs under joint route planning. This framework is based on the extended Solomon 
instance RC110_1 of the Vehicle Routing Problem with Time Windows (VRPTW, Solomon, 1987; 
Gehring and Homberger, 2001) and allows the examination of the synergy value of cooperation. 
 
The distribution network consists of a set of nodes in a plane, each node representing a single drop-off 
location. Furthermore, there is one node in the centre of the plane, which represents the distribution centre, 
from where the orders are collected. Each pair of nodes is connected by an arc. On these arcs, Euclidean 
distances are assumed. The travel time (expressed in minutes) between each pair of nodes is proportional 
to the Euclidean distances, and therefore based on a constant speed of 60 distance units per hour. Travel 
times are relevant to determining synergy values since distribution orders generally have time windows 
and working days of drivers are of limited length. 
  
In the original system without joint route planning, each customer belongs to a single FCE. This is 
implemented by successively assigning orders from the VRPTW instance to the FCEs, until the pre-set 
market shares in terms of number of distribution orders have been reached. Furthermore, FCEs have a 
sufficiently large homogeneous fleet of trucks that start and end their trips at the distribution centre. These 
trucks have a capacity of 200 units and operate at a cost of €1.42 per kilometre, and a €274 fixed cost per 
truck. Unloading (i.e. service time) takes a fixed time of 10 minutes for each customer. 
 
2.2 Benchmark case 
Problem instance RC110_1 is used to construct the benchmark case. This instance consists of 1000 orders 
of which the first 250 have been selected for the benchmark case. The orders have an average size of 
17.82 and a standard deviation of 8.08 units. In the benchmark case, there are three FCEs that engage in 
joint route planning, and their market shares are all equal. Finally, it holds that the time window widths 
equal 30 for all customers, and the distribution area is a square of 500x500. A more detailed description of 
the problem instances can be found in Solomon (1987) and Gehring and Homberger (2001). 
 
The developed benchmark scenario is summarized in Table I. Seven characteristics are assumed to have 
significance for the synergy values: number of orders per FCE (1 and 2), average order size (3), variance 
of order sizes (4), time window width (5), size of distribution area (6), and market shares of FCEs (7).  
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 Characteristic Benchmark case values 
1 Number of orders 250 
2 Number of FCEs 3 
3 Average order size  17.82 
4 Standard deviation of order size 8.08 
5 Time window width 30 
6 Size of distribution area 500x500 
7 Market shares of FCEs All equal 
Table I: The benchmark scenario 
 
The next section introduces the routing heuristic that is used to determine the synergy values. 
 
2.3 Routing heuristic 
In the classical formulation of the VRPTW, the objective is to construct routes from a common origin to 
multiple destination nodes. These routes are performed by identical trucks that start and end at the origin 
node and must be such that each destination node is visited exactly once, time windows are not violated, 
and the compound demand of the customers visited along a route does not exceed the truck’s capacity.  
 
The customary objective function for the VRPTW is of a two-stage nature. As a first criterion, the number 
of routes is minimized, and only then the distance travelled (some authors also minimize waiting time as a 
third criterion). In the current setting however, interest is in the minimum-cost solution based on the cost 
structure outlined in Section 2.1. This renders the two-stage objective function inappropriate because the 
minimum-cost solution is not necessarily the solution with the minimum number of routes. To 
accommodate this alternative objective function, a new VRPTW heuristic is constructed, which is 
described below. 
 
The heuristic starts with the construction of an initial solution, which it then attempts to improve upon. 
The initial construction heuristic is based on the modified application of Clarke and Wright’s (1964) 
savings heuristic by Liu and Shen (1999). The difference between the current heuristic and the original is 
that, when merging two routes A and B, not only positions at the start and end of route A are considered 
for insertion of route B, but also all other positions in route A. This means that in Figure 1, in addition to 









Figure 1. Modified savings construction algorithm 
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Once the initial solution has been generated, the algorithm attempts to reduce the number of routes by 
looping through all routes, trying to insert the customers one-by-one into other routes. All routes are 
considered for elimination in a random order. The customers in the route selected for elimination are 
inserted in partial random order into other routes according to how critical they are. A customer’s 
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iD  = Demand of customer i 
iTW  = Width of customer i’s time window 
iDist  = Distance of customer i from the depot 
iCrit  = Criticality of customer i 
 
If a route cannot be eliminated because not all customers could be reinserted into other routes, the 
successful insertions into other routes are undone. After the route elimination procedure, two local search 
operators, ICROSS and IOPT, are executed iteratively until no further improvement of costs can be found. 
ICROSS and IOPT are the same respectively as the well-known CROSS (Taillard et al., 1997) and Or-opt 
(Or, 1976) operators, except that the relocation of segments is also attempted in inverted order. Both 
operators are described in detail in Bräysy et al. (2004). 
 
2.4 Benchmark case results 
For the benchmark scenario developed in section 2.2, the synergy value is calculated. Because the 
algorithm starts with a random seed, 25 replications are performed and the average savings are calculated 


















Figure 2: Synergy value for the benchmark case 
 
 Original Joint route planning Improvements 
Cost 56,884.71 39,438.65 30.7% 
# Kilometres 29,778.87 20,595.67 30.8% 
Load factor 0.43 0.62 43.2% 
# Drops per route 4.72 6.76 43.2% 
# Trucks 53 37 30.2% 
Table II: Details of benchmark case savings 
 
As expected, in this specific benchmark scenario, the FCEs benefit from joint route planning. The 
customer base to construct routes has after all been increased so that truck space can be used more 
efficiently. A cost reduction of 30.7% becomes possible as a result of joint route planning. Furthermore 
the savings in kilometres driven and trucks used are around 30%. The average load factor of trucks 
increases by 43.2% from 0.43 to 0.62. These relatively low levels of truck space usage are a direct result 
of the structure of the RC110_1 problem instance under consideration: time window constraints are far 
more restrictive than capacity constraints. 
 
The scale of these benefits is of course very case specific. It is easy to construct instances where savings 
are very high or very low. Therefore, the next section discusses a case study to underpin the range of 
savings found in the benchmark case. 
 
 
3. Joint route planning in practice 
 
This section illustrates joint route planning by means of a case study in the Dutch catering sector. In 2001, 
three Dutch companies (Douwe Egberts, Unipro and Masterfoods) started a cooperation to increase the 
efficiency of their distribution networks for frozen products. All three companies supply frozen products 
to catering outlets at schools, companies, hospitals, government organizations, etc. For Douwe Egberts, 
these products are mainly coffee extracts, for Unipro bread and pastry, and for Masterfoods mostly ice 
cream. These products are delivered by means of expensive temperature controlled trucks, which means 
that logistics costs make up a relatively large share of the product price. Given the existence of a 
considerable amount of overlap between customers, 68% on average, the companies decided that a joint 
distribution of their products could be an interesting opportunity.  
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The inventory was moved from three private distribution centres in Wolvega, Dongen and Beuningen, to a 
new purpose-build joint distribution centre in Utrecht, the geographical centre of the Netherlands. In 
addition, the warehousing and distribution activities were outsourced to logistics service provider C. van 





Figure 3: Case study: centralization and joint route planning 
 
Actual routes for weekly order sets were used to compare key performance indicators of the ex-ante and 
ex-post situations. The results can be found in Table III, and are based on a homogeneous fleet consisting 
of trucks with a capacity of 26 units. The average drop size improves in the new situation, because Douwe 
Egberts, Unipro and Masterfoods have a number of joint customers. The orders of these customers are 
consolidated which improves the efficiency of the distribution process. Additionally, savings are attained 
because the customers belonging to different companies are located ‘close’ to each other so that their 
orders can be combined in one route. 
 
 Before After Improvements 
# Trucks 4245 2106 50.4% 
Drop size 2.52 3.5 38.9% 
Drops per year 21,225 15,161 28.6% 
Kilometres per year 1,460,000 1,010,000 30.8% 
Table III: Results of introduction of central distribution centre 
 
For this case joint route planning saves 30.8% of distance travelled. In the new situation load factors are 
very high (over 95%), resulting in a fleet reduction of 50%. 
 
The synergy value of 30.8% in terms of kilometres driven in this specific case is well in line with the 
results of the benchmark scenario in the previous section. This is however not true in general. The possible 
reduction in fleet size for example is much higher here. Furthermore, there are several other existing cases 
of joint route planning, where the savings deviate quite strongly from the 30% attained in the benchmark 
case. For example, Bahrami (2002) describes the merge of separate distribution networks pertaining to 
two producers of consumer goods (Henkel and Schwarzkopf) into one joint distribution network. In this 
case distribution costs are estimated to fall by (only) 15.3% as a result of joint route planning. Cruijssen et 
al. (2005) also discuss a case of joint route planning wherein four grocery retail chains cooperate by 
performing joint route planning for the distribution of their frozen goods to local supermarkets. The 
savings in distribution costs reported there amount to 20.3%. Finally LeBlanc et al. (forthcoming) discuss 
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a case relating to the primary transport (i.e. from supplier sites to distribution centres of retailers) of 
grocery products. The authors discuss two cases of cooperation: 
1. Joint route planning by the suppliers: they deliver the goods to the retailers’ distribution centre. 
2. Joint route planning by the retailers: they pick up the goods at the suppliers’ sites. 
The first constitutes a traditional situation whereas the second is an example of so-called Factory Gate 
Pricing. The reported savings due to joint route planning are 27.1% in the traditional situation, and 11.4% 
in the Factory Gate Pricing situation. 
 
It can be concluded that synergy values in the cases mentioned in this section show a quite strong 
variability. It is however very important for potential partners to have a reliable estimate of potential 
savings, before they engage in joint route planning. Since it is not always possible for companies to make 
a detailed estimation of the distribution costs in the ex-ante and ex-post situations, the next section will 
develop an intuition on the impact of scenario-specific characteristics on the synergy value. This can be 
useful for partners wishing to obtain an indication of the maximum achievable savings quickly. These 
insights may in turn both intensify and speed up the negotiations, and increase the probability of the actual 
start and prosperity of a cooperation (cf. Verstrepen et al., 2006). 
 
 
4. Sensitivity analysis 
 
The variability in synergy values is a direct consequence of operational (routing) characteristics of the 
sectors in which cooperation takes place. The characteristics were already listed in Table I. In this section, 
various markets are resembled by varying one characteristic at a time and fixing the others at their 
benchmark scenario value. Table IV defines the range for each characteristic and the corresponding step 
sizes. 
 
Characteristic Minimum Maximum Step size 
Number of orders per FCE 10 - 10 
Average order size  0.2 8 0.2 
Standard deviation of order size 0 4 0.1 
Time window width 0 20 0.5 
Size of distribution area 0.1 1 0.025 
Market shares of FCEs 0 1 0.025 
Table IV: Range of characteristics values 
 
In the following subsections the synergy values are plotted for the characteristics listed in Table IV. Each 
data point in the plots corresponds to the average result of 25 runs of the VRPTW heuristic described in 
Section 2.3. The data point corresponding to the benchmark scenario is denoted by a larger grey dot. In 
each plot, the horizontal axis represents the values of the characteristic under consideration. The vertical 
axis represents the average per cent savings due to joint route planning as compared to the benchmark 
scenario. 
 
4.1 Number of orders per FCE 
Figure 4 shows the sensitivity of the synergy value with respect to the number of orders per FCE. The 
number of orders per FCE is increased in intermediate steps of 10, till the total reaches 1000. The 
maximum number of orders per FCE therefore varies from scenario to scenario depending on the number 
of FCEs. In general, synergy values tend to increase  initially, and then, having attained the maximum 
level, decrease. The rationale behind this is that when there are very few orders available there is not 
enough scale for a strong efficiency improvement through joint route planning. Isolated drop-off locations 
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have a high probability of remaining isolated also in the joint route planning scenario, even more so when 
time windows avoid efficient combinations in a single route. On the other hand, when the number of 
orders per FCE is very large, each individual company has better economies of scale and is able to carry 
out routes more efficiently. Theoretically, the synergy values will tend to zero if the number of orders per 
FCE runs to infinity. However, even when only two FCEs cooperate each having a 'large' individual 
orderset of 500, joint route planning still offers a promising opportunity to reduce costs (synergy value is 
17.8%). Figure 4 also indicates that the more FCEs active in joint route planning, the higher the maximum 
savings, and the slower the synergy value tends to zero. This analysis demonstrates that, in relative terms, 
joint route planning is more profitable for small transport companies than for larger ones. This is an 
important consideration in, for example, the Netherlands and Belgium, where fragmentation in the road 
transport industry is high. In these two countries, there are approximately 15,000 transport companies, or 1 
company per 1,800 inhabitants. Furthermore, Cruijssen et al. (2006) demonstrate that for Flemish road 
transport companies it holds that 'large' companies operate more efficiently than 'small' ones. 
Consolidation through joint route planning could therefore prove a promising option. However, it may not 
be reasonable to expect a very large number of small FCEs to cooperate in joint route planning, since the 
transaction costs needed for setting up and maintaining such a partnership will eventually outweigh the 
absolute cost savings FCEs can attain. An elaboration on the role of transaction costs however lies beyond 
the scope of this paper. A detailed discussion of various types of transaction costs in collaborative 
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Figure 4: Sensitivity: number of orders per FCE 
 
 
4.2 Average order size 
Figure 5 depicts the influence of order size on the maximum achievable synergy values. The average 
demand of the orders is varied by multiplying the size of every order by a factor that is defined per 
scenario. Fractional demands are rounded to the nearest integer. In the benchmark case, the average 
demand is 18.82 and the multiplication factor is equal to 1. At the left-most part of Figure 5, the factor is 
0.1, and capacity restrictions are virtually absent. In this case, time window restrictions become the critical 
element in the route construction. With the maximum value however (right-most side of Figure 5), even 
average orders cannot be combined in a single truck, making capacity restrictions most important. In that 
case the average order size equals 134, and most of the orders are larger than half a truck capacity, 
rendering opportunities for consolidation in a single truck rare. The interpretation for real world 
applications is that joint route planning is more profitable in sectors where orders are small (e.g. consumer 


























Figure 5: Sensitivity: average order size 
 
 
4.3 Standard deviation of order size 
Figure 6 shows the relation between synergy values and the variability in order sizes. The standard 
deviation of the demand size is adjusted by multiplying an order’s deviation from the average order size 
by a scenario-dependent factor. In this process the minimum order size remains 1, and the maximum order 
size 200. With the exception of these cut-off values, this transformation leaves the average demand size 
unaltered. It turns out that there is no apparent relation between order size variability and synergy value or, 
in other words, increased scale is no solution to the operational problems imposed by a strong variability 
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Figure 6: Sensitivity: standard deviation of order sizes 
 
 
4.4 Time window width 
In the benchmark case, all time windows have a half-width of 15. In order to study the impact of time 
window width on the synergy value of joint route planning, the half-width is multiplied by a scenario-
dependent factor. For example, a time window of [200, 230] and a factor of 2 result in a new time window 
of [215-15*2, 215+15*2], or [185,245]. Each time the window is limited however by the earliest and latest 
possible time at which a truck can leave and enter the depot. Figure 7 reveals the results of this sensitivity 
analysis. It shows that synergy values are highest in a situation with time windows of ‘average’ width. 
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The reason for this lies in the fact that when time windows are very narrow there is hardly any flexibility 
in building the routes and it is thus hard to fully capitalize on increased economies of scale. On the other 
hand, when time windows are very wide, the synergy value also tends to decrease. This is because FCEs 
can already build quite efficient routes individually, because many orders can be combined into a feasible 
route. This illustrates the strong impact of time window constraints on the solution value for VRPTWs. 
For example, on the left-most side of the graph, the value of 0 refers to time windows that are in fact 
single points in time where service at a customer’s drop-off location must start. In that case, total 
distribution costs under joint route planning amount to 55,588.28. When time windows are really wide 
(factor 8; time window width of 240), these costs are 28,768.55. This means that imposing these strict 
























Figure 7: Sensitivity: Time window width 
 
 
4.5 Size of distribution area 
The sixth characteristic that potentially influences the level of synergy is the size of the distribution area, 
since this has direct consequences for the average distance between drop-off locations. To vary the size of 
the distribution area, the distance of each drop-off location from the depot is multiplied by a scenario-
defined factor, and its position relocated on the line that starts at the depot site and crosses the customer’s 
former position. For example, with a factor of 0.5, a customer that was located at coordinates [ ]300,150  
in the benchmark scenario, is relocated to: 
[ ] [ ]250 (300 250)*0.5, 250 (150 250)*0.5 275,200+ − + − = . 
 
The results in Figure 8 show that the synergy value gradually increases as the average distance between 
customers increases. This suggests that joint route planning is more profitable in sectors where customers 
are located across a large region (e.g. Europe), than in sectors where customers are located quite close to 
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Figure 8: Sensitivity: size of distribution area 
 
 
4.6 Market shares of FCEs 
The last characteristic that is varied in order to study its impact on the synergy value is the distribution of 
market shares over the three FCEs present in the benchmark scenario. The market concentration is 
determined by the Gini coefficient. Although this measure originates from social welfare theory, it can be 
straightforwardly applied to describe the inequality of market shares of FCEs in the setting of joint route 



















x  is the market share of FCE i, 
and x  is the average market share. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the market share of FCE 
i is smaller than the market share of FCE j, when i < j. More specifically, 1i ix xβ −= , and 1>β . Under 







=∑ , it is possible to choose the Gini coefficient for the benchmark scenario 
























2 1x xβ=  (8) 
2
3 1x xβ=  (9) 
 
When the Gini coefficient is at the benchmark level of 0, there is perfect equality of market shares and the 
order set is distributed evenly over the FCEs. On the other hand, a Gini coefficient of 1 indicates that the 
total market is in the hands of only one FCE. Figure 9 shows that the synergy value decreases when the 
total order set is divided less evenly over the participating FCEs. This is explained by the fact that in a 































5. Concluding remarks 
 
 
This paper discussed the concept of joint route planning. Joint route planning can essentially be achieved 
in two ways: outsourcing or horizontal cooperation. The goal of both concepts is to attain larger 
economies of scale that help to cut down distribution costs. For example, in the benchmark scenario 
described in Section 2.2, the savings due to joint route planning are considerable: 30.7% of total 
distribution costs. 
 
Sensitivity analyses were conducted to gain insight into the main drivers for synergy, and how these affect 
the synergy value. The results indicate that joint route planning is most beneficial in situations where there 
are a large number of FCEs of a uniform and not too large size. Furthermore, the synergy value increases 
if order sizes are small compared to a standard truck’s capacity, time windows are narrow, and inter-
customer distances are large. Finally, the variation in order sizes does not seem to play an important role. 
These results are easily interpreted and can be used by practitioners to develop intuition on synergy value 
should there be no time or budget to go through all the calculations. This intuition thus allows for a rapid 
determination as to whether a group of FCEs has a strong synergy potential. 
 
The paper dealt with a basic distribution setting. Further research is needed to understand the impact of 
joint route planning in more complex distribution systems. For example a significant contribution would 
be an investigation into how the results of the analysis would be influenced by the introduction of e.g. 
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